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Rule 10b-5 in the Balance:
An Analysis of the Supreme
Court's Policy Perspective
By Roy L. BROOKS*

Since 1975, the United States Supreme Court has imposed a
series of restrictions on the right of a private individual to bring an
action for damages 1 under rule 10b-5.2 On successive occasions the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego. B.A., 1972, University of Connecticut; J.D., 1975, Yale University.
1. The Supreme Court has acknowledged its reconsideration of the policies underlying
its interpretation of the implied private right of action under rule 10b-5 and other similar
implied private rights of action. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698 n.24
(1979). Although the Court in Cannon ruled in favor of the implication of a private action
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, a statute that has no resemblance to
§ 10(b) or rule 10b-5, it subsequently refused to imply a private damage remedy under a
different federal statute which was patterned after § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. See Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (acknowledging change of attitude); Cherner, Considering the
State Court as a Forum for Securities Actions, 9 CuM. L. REv. 663, 664 (1979) (noting the
Supreme Court's unfavorable attitude) [hereinafter cited as Cherner].
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Rule 10b-5 was promulgated in 1942 by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (hereinafter referred to as the SEC or Commission) pursuant to
authority granted under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 15
U.S.C. § 78j (1976). Section 10(b) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
Rule 10b-5 states: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
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Court has placed limitations on plaintiffs' standing to sue,3 imposed a stricter standard of proof needed to establish a breach of
duty4 narrowed the scope of the rule's coverage,5 and, most recently, limited the duty to disclose material, nonpublic information.6 These rulings bespeak an attitude towards rule 10b-5 private
damages actions that directly contraposes the expansive approach
taken by the lower federal courts prior to 1975.7
The Supreme Court's restrictive construction of rule 10b-5
seems primarily motivated by policy considerations. As Justice
Rehnquist stated in defense of the purchaser-seller rule set forth in
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.:8
We have no doubt that [denying relief to some defrauded persons] is indeed a disadvantage of the Birnbaum rule, and if it had
no countervailing advantages it would be undesirable as a matter
of policy, however much it might be supported by precedent and
legislative history. But we are of the opinion that there are countervailing advantages to the Birnbaum rule, purely as a matter of
policy, although those advantages are more difficult to articulate
than is the disadvantage.9
Notwithstanding possible difficulties of articulation, there is
nothing irreverent about taking a policy approach to judicial decisionmaking, courts do it frequently. The problem, however, is that
the selection of an overriding policy as deserving of judicial protection is not dissimilar to the determination of whose ox should be
gored. Post-1974 Supreme Court decisions concerning rule 10b-5
private damages actions leave little doubt that, in the eyes of the
Supreme Court, the lower federal courts have been goring the
wrong ox for nearly three decades.
tion with the purchase or sale of any security."
For detailed analyses of rule 10b-5, see A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC
RULE 10b-5 (1968); A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 (1974); 3 L. Loss, SECURIrIES
REGULATION (2d ed. 1961); W. PAINTER, FEDmAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING (1968).
See also W. CARY,CORPORATIONS 712-99 (1969); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURrnIEs REGULATION 1052-1230 (3d ed. 1972).

3.

See notes 70-83 & accompanying text infra.

4.

See notes 84-88 & accompanying text infra.

5. See notes 89-98 & accompanying text infra.
6.
7.

See notes 99-106 & accompanying text infra.
See discussion at notes 35-66 & accompanying text infra.

8. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). The Birnbaum doctrine
states that a person injured by a fraudulent securities transaction must be an actual purchaser or seller of securities in order to have standing to sue under rule 10b-5. For further
discussion of the Birnbaum doctrine, see notes 54-60 & accompanying text infra.
9.

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738-39 (1975).
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This Article analyzes the Supreme Court's new policy approach to private damages litigation under rule 10b-5. The Article
first examines the common law for an historical perspective of private damages securities litigation. Next, the pre-1975 federal regime of law and policy under rule 10b-5, developed primarily by
the lower courts, is reviewed. The Article then examines the Supreme Court's current policy perspective, a reaction to conditions
created by prior lower federal court decisions. Given the Supreme
Court's restrictive attitude toward rule 10b-5, the Article suggests
a few of the more significant alternatives to rule 10b-5 available to
litigants seeking private damages. The Article concludes with the
determination that in light of the relevant policy considerations,
the Supreme Court's limitations on the scope of rule 10b-5 may
well be justified.

The Common Law
In applying the common law, American courts rarely articulated comprehensive underlying policies concerning the purchase
or sale of securities. 10 It is not surprising, therefore, that the legal
10. See Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933)
[hereinafter cited as Shulman]. In 1933, Congress formulated what may be the first comprehensive public policy on securities transactions articulated in the United States: an antifraud policy and a policy in favor of full and fair disclosure in the offering of securities. See
Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Preamble, 48 Stat. 74 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77
(1976)). See also Brooks, Currency Translationsin the RegistrationStatements of Foreign
Issuers, 35 Bus. LAw. 435, 439 (1980). Similar policies of fairness and honesty in securities
trading are articulated in the 1934 Act. See notes 46-49 & accompanying text infra.
The antifraud, fairness, and disclosure policies of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were, in part,
reactions to the business excesses of the 1920's. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 194 (1976). The English experienced similar problems in the 18th century which led to
the passage of the Bubble Act of 1719. It is unlikely, however, that a repetition of history
would have been avoided had the American common law courts drawn upon the earlier
English experience to formulate policy and rules. Indeed, the Bubble Act of 1719, which was
repealed by Parliament in 1825, actually had the effect of deflating many a fortune. See B.
WAssmtsm, CoRPORATn

FNANCE LAw 3 (1978). In addition, Americans did not begin to

make important use of the corporation, from which most major issues of securities transactions are drawn, until about 1780. From that time, there was little relevant English experience on which the courts could draw. As one commentator has stated: "[Americans] proceeded to use the corporate instrument on a scale unmatched in England. In that
development we built public policy toward the corporation almost wholly out of our own
wants and concerns, shaped primarily by our own institutions." V. HURsT, THE LEGITIMACY
OF THE BusmEss CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNrraD STATEs 8 (1970). For a more detailed discussion, see 2 J. DAVIs, EssAYs IN THE EARLmn HISTORY OF AMERiCAN CORPORATIONS
(1917);

V. HURST, TaE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSImSS

COPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED
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regime at common law was not particularly well-adapted to dealing
with securities fraud."" Plaintiffs in securities fraud cases had to
look to general contract and tort law for relief.12
At common law, however, resort to contract theory was severely limited because recovery was unavailable unless the defendant had breached some express covenant with the plaintiff."3
Realistically, therefore, a plaintiff was limited to the tort theories
of deceit or general fraud as bases for the recovery of damages. In
order to prevail on either theory, the plaintiff usually had to prove
five elements: (1) that the defendant was under a duty to trade
fairly with the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant intentionally
breached that duty; (3) that the parties were in privity at the time
of the breach; (4) that the plaintiff relied on the defendant's
wrongdoing; and (5) that, as a result of this reliance, the plaintiff
4

sustained consequential damages.'
Duty of Fair Dealing

A limited duty of fair dealing was imposed upon persons engaged in commercial or financial dealings at common law. Under
circumstances involving affirmative representations, the duty was
to refrain from making any affirmative misrepresentation 5 of a
material's fact. In cases of omission, there was no general common
STATES 3-9 (1970).

11. See Shulman, supra note 10, at 227.
12. Id.
13. A theory of implied warranty does not appear actionable at common law. See id. at
230 n.10 Note, The Liability of Directorsand Officers for Misrepresentationsin the Sale of
Securities, 34 COLum. L. Rav. 1090 (1934).
14. Various jurisdictions have modified or qualified some of these elements; hence, any
statement of the relevant points of law must be at best a tentative one, with the qualification that many courts do not agree. See W. PROSSEaR, LAW OF TORTS 685-86 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PRossER]. Indeed, Dean Prosser's assessment of the relevant elements
is slightly different from the statement used herein. See id. For other statements of the
relevant points of law, see F. HARPER, A TRE~TsE ON THE LAw OF TORTS 444-45 (1933);

Shulman, supra note 10, at 227-33. Cases applying various elements of the common law
action have been collected in the foregoing works. Therefore, an exhaustive citation of cases
for the ensuing discussion will not be attempted.
15. Half-truths or conduct otherwise calculated to convey false or misleading impressions may constitute an affirmative misrepresentation. An example would be withholding
dividends in order to reduce the price of the stock. See PROSSER, supra note 14, at 694-99.
16. Materiality was defined by a pre-Erie Supreme Court as an extraordinary event
affecting the economic value of the corporation. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909)
("special facts" doctrine). Cases such as Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531
(1932) (declaration of a substantial dividend), and Goodwin v. Agassiz, 238 Mass. 358, 186
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law duty to disclose material, nonpublic information;"7 a duty to
disclose such information arose only where the parties to the transaction were not dealing at arm's length, but rather were in some
confidential or fiduciary relationship.18
The common law courts were divided as to the scope of an
insider's duty to disclose material, nonpublic facts. A majority of
courts took the position that a director was under no duty to disclose such facts in transactions with individual shareholders of a
corporation.19 It was argued that imposing such a duty would frustrate public policy by placing a significant burden on directors so
that "men of experience
and ability will be deterred from ac'20
cepting such office."
A minority of common law courts, however, found disclosure
to shareholders to be within the scope of a director's duty to disclose material facts.2 1 These courts advanced two reasons for deciding that failing to impose such a duty was undesirable as a matter of public policy. First, the rule countenanced unfair dealings
between individuals joined by a relationship of trust or confiN.E. 659 (1933) (discovery of rich mineral deposits), would seem to meet the test for materiality under the special facts doctrine. See also PROssaa, supra note 14, at 718; REsTATEmErr
op TORTS § 538 (1938).
17. See PRossER, supra note 14, at 695. There are even "modem cases which have
held that so long as one adversary does not actively mislead another, he is perfectly free to
take advantage, no matter how unfair, of ignorance." Id. at 695-96.
18. Id. at 697. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). See also Annot., 84 A.L.R. 615 (1933); 19
CORNELL L.Q. 103 (1933); 47 HARv. L. Rav. 353 (1933); 32 MICH.L. Rv.678 (1934). Hence,
the existence of a relationship of trust or confidence between parties to a transaction necessarily affected the scope of the duty to disclose. See discussion at notes 19-23 & accompanying text infra.
19. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 (1873); Goodwin v. Agassiz,
283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); Connolly v. Shannon, 105 N.J. Eq. 155, 147 A. 234
(1929), aff'd, 107 N.J. 180, 151 A. 905 (1930).
20. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 363, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933). Although late in
the development of the common law, this is one of the few comprehensive articulations of
policy by the common law courts. It was formulated at the same time, and probably in
reaction to the same American experience, as the federal disclosure policy of the securities
acts. See note 10 supra. Ironically, the common law policy of nondisclosure contradicted the
federal policy in favor of full and fair disclosure.
21. The minority rule is sometimes referred to as the "Kansas rule" after Hotchkiss v.
Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932). See, e.g., Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir.
1952); Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903). The Supreme Court's decision in
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), which held a chief executive officer and majority
shareholder of a Philippine corporation under a duty to disclose material facts to the plaintiff shareholder, was in accord with the minority rule.
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dence.2 2 Second, the majority rule was perceived as impeding capital formation because the public might be reluctant to invest in
corporations under those circumstances where there was no duty to
disclose material, nonpublic facts to shareholders. 2 Even where
the plaintiff was owed a duty of fair dealing, however, the necessity
of showing an intentional breach remained.
Intentional Breach
The common law requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate an
intentional breach, or scienter, 4 created a heavy burden in private
damages actions. Facts probative of a defendant's state of mind
were not easily established.2 Even in cases where the defendant
made the mistake of memorializing his or her mental condition, a
plaintiff received little assistance from the discovery rules in obtaining authorization to search the defendant's files or business
records where such inculpatory evidence was likely to repose.2
There is little question that relative to a negligence or recklessness standard, a scienter requirement significantly increases the
obstacles to successful litigation by plaintiffs. To that extent, the
scienter standard discouraged frivolous or vexatious litigation. This
obstacle was compounded by the third element, a privity
requirement.
Privity
The requirement that the plaintiff be in privity with the defendant was an absolute precondition to a common law action for
securities fraud.27 The requirement contemplated a face to face
22. See Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 537-38, 16 P.2d 531, 535 (1932).
23. See Note, Civil Liability Under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 VA. L. REv. 537, 550-51 (1956).
24. Scienter has been defined as "the intent to deceive, to mislead, to convey a false
impression." PROSSFR, supra note 14, at 700. See Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
Some English and American common law courts, however, employed different formulations
of the knowledge element. Consequently, a recklessness, or even a negligence, standard was
used in some damages cases. See PRossER, supra note 14, at 700-09; Shulman, supra note
10, at 233-35.
25. See RESTATEMENT OF ToaTs § 526 .(1938). See also note 24 supra.
26. Unlike the federal system and many state systems today, there was very little discovery at common law or under the state codes. See F. JAIMEs & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE xxii, ch. 6 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as J~mss & HAZARD]; C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs §§ 81-90 (3d ed. 1976).
27. See Shulman, supra note 10, at 239; Note, The Prospects for Rule X-lOb-5: An
Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1124 (1950).
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transaction, making it unlikely that a plaintiff could recover where
the transaction in question took place on a stock exchange. 28 On
the other hand, it was possible that a faceless or remote stock exchange transaction could satisfy the privity requirement. For example, if the plaintiff had traded in stock with a market so limited
that the transaction could be traced to the actual wrongdoer, there
was no reason why privity could not be established. 29
A privity requirement served the purpose of establishing a
nexus between the parties and militated against speculative or erroneous recovery. At common law, the nexus between the plaintiff
and the defendant had to be drawn even closer by demonstrating
the element of reliance.
Reliance
The reliance, or causation, requirement significantly restricted
further the class of plaintiffs able to maintain a securities fraud
action at common law. To prove reliance, a plaintiff had to show
that the defendant's act or omission was a substantial factor in engendering plaintiff's conduct." Such a precondition to imposition
of damages on a defendant seems at least intuitively fair because it
sought, with a minimum of speculation, to join a wrongful act with
its correlative harmful consequences. In addition, once the common law became committed to the privity element, juxtaposing a
wrongful act with its harmful consequences was quite reasonable. 1
The reliance element also had the salutory effect of reasonably
limiting damages.
Damages
The final common law requirement, that the plaintiff demonstrate actual damages as a prerequisite to recovery for a securities
fraud, was straightforward. A plaintiff's damages could not be
speculative; they had to be actual and arise as a consequence of the
28.

See Shulman, supra note 10, at 239.

29. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). Although the plaintiff
in Goodwin lost on the question of scope of duty, he apparently was able to trace the wrongdoing to the defendant because the transaction in question was the only one executed on the
Boston Stock Exchange at the time of plaintiff's sale.
30. See PRossER, supra note 14, at 714.
31. It is sometimes difficult to see where the privity requirement ends and the reliance
requirement begins. See Shulman, supra note 10, at 239.
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2

Impact of Common Law Elements
The common law courts generally did not develop a frontal or
holistic approach to resolving problems involving securities fraud.
This failure to articulate well-defined underlying policy considerations led to eclectic judicial resolutions of securities litigation. The
courts were left to draw from their own experiences with tort and
contract cases, especially the former. On those rare occasions when
the court's decisions reflected on a policy foundation, the majority
attitude countenanced a degree of unfairness in commercial and
financial dealings. Most judges felt constrained to proscribe fraudulent securities dealings, but there seemed to be no overriding urge
to legislate fairness.
The judicial concern with preventing fraud without imposing
broad standards of fairness seems consistent with the character of
common law legal thought in its entirety. The elements of a common law cause of action for damages, on the whole, combined to
create a substantial disincentive to litigation. The scope of the
duty, under either the majority or minority rule, limited the class
of plaintiffs in cases of omission to act. In addition, the elements of
scienter, privity, and reliance made it difficult for even the protected class of plaintiffs to prevail on the merits. Despite some
judicially imposed adjustments, the end result of the common law
scheme seemed inevitable: a plaintiff had a difficult time prevailing in court.3 3
The federal system of policy and law that developed under
rule 10b-5 was quite different from the common law's approach to
securities fraud. Most lower federal courts exhibited little tolerance for unfairness and, consequently, the contours of rule 10b-5
were molded to promote a policy of fairness. 4
32. See PROSSER, supra note 14, at 685-86.
33. For example, some courts which did not employ a scienter-knowledge standard
imposed stricter privity requirements. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW 402 (1966).

34. "[T]he underlying purpose of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 [is] 'to prevent inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fairness in securities transactions generally. . .. '
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 240 (2d Cir. 1974)
(quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969)). Indeed, rule 10b-5 on its face would seem to reach unfairness as well as
fraud. See note I supra. On the other hand, "[a]lthough the extensive legislative history of
the 1934 Act is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent," Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976), there is at least a scintilla of evidence that the SEC
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Lower Federal Court Construction of Rule lOb-5
Prior to 1975
From 1946 to 1975, the major legal dimensions of the implied
private right of action under rule 10b-5 were shaped by the lower
federal courts, 5 with the Second Circuit in particular playing a
major role.36 On the whole, the lower courts employed rule 10b-5 in
a manner evidencing a liberal attitude towards securities litigation.
Problems engendered by the attendant surge in securities litigation
7
set the stage for the Supreme Court's eventual retrenchment.
To recover damages in a private action under rule 10b-5, most
circuit courts required a defrauded securities plaintiff to establish
that: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of fair dealing;
(2) the plaintiff was a purchaser or seller of securities during the
time of the wrongdoing; and (3) the plaintiff sustained damages,
albeit nonconsequentially. The vitality of the coxhmon law element
of scienter was uncertain, 8 and the reliance, or causation, element
was at best vitiated."' Privity was no longer required at all. 0
itself intended rule 10b-5 to reach only fraud. When the rule was presented to the SEC in
1942, none of the commissioners "said anything except Sumner Pike who said, 'Well... we
are against fraud, aren't we?'" Conference on Codification of the FederalSecurities Laws,
22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967) (comments of Milton Freeman).
35. The first case implying a private cause of action under rule 10b-5 was Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See also Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
36. The most famous rule 10b-5 case is SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Perhaps equally expansive was Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
37. For an interesting discussion of the unexpected expansion of rule 10b-5 from a rule
of fraud to one of fairness, see Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws,
22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967). See also Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial
Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963).
38. Some circuits ruled that negligence, not scienter, was a requisite element of a rule
10b-5 private action. See, e.g., Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1975); City Nat'l Bank
v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970). Other circuits
were uncertain whether the requisite standard was negligence, scienter, or something else,
such as a "flexible duty." See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); Rochez
Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 1973). Subsequent to its Texas Gulf Sulfur
decision, the Second Circuit consistently held that scienter was required. See, e.g., Lanza v.
Drexel, 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d
1276, 1290-91 (2d Cir. 1969).
39. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
238-40 (2d Cir. 1974). "All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the
sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of
this decision....
This obligation to disclose ... a material fact establish[es] the requisite
element of causation in fact." Id. at 240 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
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Duty of Fair Dealing: An Expanded Scope
The federal courts imposed a duty of fair dealing under circumstances involving either affirmative representation or omission.
Like the common law, the duty imposed in cases of representation
was to refrain from making material,41 affirmative misstatements.4 2
Unlike the common law, however, in cases of omission there existed a general duty to disclose material, nonpublic information. 8
The scope of duty to disclose under rule 10b-5 was greatly expanded compared to its common law counterpart. Whereas the
common law preconditioned such a duty on an existing relationship of trust or confidence, a rule 10b-5 party came within the
scope of duty merely by possessing material, nonpublic information.4 Many courts held this expansion to be proper as a matter of
406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972)) (emphasis added by Shapiro).
40. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239
(2d Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 101 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
41. Although it has been suggested that the definition of materiality might vary depending on the context in which the issue is raised, see, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531
F.2d 39, 48 (2d Cir. 1976) (a relaxed definition might be warranted for injunctive relief or
disgorgement), the basic definition applicable in private damage actions is whether the facts
relate to "situations which are essentially extraordinary in nature" or "whether a reasonable
man would attach importance [to the facts]... in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question.... This, of course, encompasses any fact. . . 'which in reasonable
and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities.'"
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). This formulation is similar to the common
law "special facts" doctrine, see note 16 supra, and with other common law definitions of
materiality. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d at 848-49 (citing the RESTATEmENT
OF TORTS § 538 (2) (1938), W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 554-55 (3d ed. 1964), and F. HARPzR
& F. JAmEs, Twa LAW

OF

TORTS 565-66 (1956)). See also Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d

414 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840 (1974); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). The definition of materiality under rule lOb-5 is
basically consistent with the materiality definition used in connection with proxy solicitations, which takes account of those facts which a reasonable investor would consider. See
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). It is also consistent with the concept
of materiality applicable to the 1933 Act. See Brooks, Currency Translations in the RegistrationStatements of Foreign Issuers, 35 Bus. LAw. 435, 439 n.36 (1980).
42. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1980); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974).
43. "[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to
the investing public, or ... abstain from trading in or recommending the securities." SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
44. Compare note 43 & accompanying text supra with note 18 & accompanying text
supra. In addition, rule lOb-5 expanded the class of plaintiffs relative to the express antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. One of the reasons for adopting rule 10b-5 was
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public policy. In the first instance, the expanded duty to disclose
promoted three important congressional policies: a policy of market integrity;4 5 a policy of equal access to information; 46 and a
policy of equal bargaining power. 47 The Supreme Court itself, in

Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,48 recognized the permissibility of
judicial rulemaking, allowing enforcement through private litigation, in deference to congressional policies.4 Additionally, the ex-

panded version of the scope of duty, by broadening the class of
potential plaintiffs, arguably promoted other important policies
to provide a cause of action for defrauded sellers of securities who could not bring an action
under the 1933 or 1934 Acts. See SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). See also Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) (buyers as well as sellers may sue under rule lob-5
"without any distinction whatever"). Because of the buyer "overlap" between certain express statutory actions and rule 10b-5, some lower federal courts refused to imply a rule
lob-5 private action. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa.
1948); Montague v. Electronic Corp., 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
45. The "broad Congressional design. . . 'to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in ... [securities] transactions,"' SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
855 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (quoting § 2 of the 1934 Act and citing
cases), is promoted by expanding the scope of duty because, inter alia, it brings more investors within the protection of the federal securities laws and hence can encourage a broad
sense of security among investors. For example, investors may feel protected from manipulation in the market price of a security by delay in the disclosure of material information.
See H.R. RsEP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1933). For other congressional expressions
regarding the market integrity policy, see Preamble to the 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 74, and H.R.
REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 6, 10 (1933). See also United States v. Chiarella, 588
F.2d 1358, 1362 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S.Ct. 1109 (1980) (citing cases).
46. "[Tlhe Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to
material information. . . ." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (emphasis added). See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 5, 6, 11 (1934); S.REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934). See also United States v.
Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1362 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S.Ct. 1109 (1980); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Feuner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961); Cary, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. 1009,
1010 (1966).
47. The rule is "an attempt to provide some degree of equalization of bargaining position." Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951). See H.R. REP. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, 11 (1934); S.REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934). See
also Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 101 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965); Loss, The Opinion,
24 Bus. LAW. 527, 529-30 (1969).
48. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
49. The judicial policy in favor of vindicating statutory values also supported the
Supreme Court's unprecedented imposition of attorneys' fees in Mills. Based on this policy,
the Court in Mills awarded interim attorneys' fees to plaintiff's attorney notwithstanding
the lack of statutory authorization and the general American rule to the contrary. Id. at 382,
389-92. See J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-33 (1964).
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frequently favored by the courts. By fostering a greater sense of
security for investors, it promoted a policy favoring capital formation.50 A policy of augmenting compliance with the securities laws
was effectuated by subjecting more wrongdoers to the threat of litigation."1 A final "judicial" policy which supported the expanded
scope of duty was the venerable policy of providing a judicial fo52
rum for a person aggrieved by wrongdoing.
The ability of these policies to withstand scrutiny under competing policy considerations was not tested by the Supreme Court
for some time.53 In the meantime, such policy considerations provided the impetus to a construction of rule 10b-5's scope of duty
that unmistakably favored plaintiffs. Other elements of rule 10b-5
actions were similarly structured to favor plaintiffs in federal securities fraud litigation.
Purchaser-Seller:

A New View of Reliance

The requirement that the plaintiff, but not necessarily the defendant," be either a purchaser or seller of securities was established early in the pre-1975 evolution of rule 10b-5.5 5 The purchaser-seller rule, commonly known as the Birnbaum doctrine,"
was the only significant pre-1975 restriction on rule 10b-5 private
damage actions and even this restriction was not absolute. As a
consequence of the hardships worked by strictly applying the purchaser-seller rule, courts fashioned "mitigating doctrines granting
standing to plaintiffs who [were] not technically purchasers or
50. See note 23 & accompanying text supra.
51. See JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 26, at 1-2 (the purpose of civil procedure is to
augment compliance with the substantive law's prescription). It is interesting to note that
some of the major competing policies later raised by the Supreme Court are also derived
from procedural foundations. See notes 76-80 & accompanying text infra.
52. Providing an injured person with a day in court is a necessary ingredient of a
mature society. Without access to the state's machinery for dispute resolution, an injured
person would be reduced to self-help, thereby creating the conditions for frontier justice.
See generally Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 827 (5th Cir. 1967); M.
ROSENBERG, G. WEINSTEIN, H. SmIT & H. KORN, ELEMENTS OF CIvIL PROCEDURE 42-58 (1976).
53. See notes 74-82 & accompanying text infra.
54-. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 857-64 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (corporate defendant held liable on basis of misleading press
release even though no purchases were executed on its behalf).
55. The purchaser-seller requirement was first articulated in Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
56. Id.
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Whether the Birnbaum doctrine was fair or unreasonably restrictive depended primarily on one's policy perspective. For those
judges who believed rule 10b-5 should effectuate a public preference for providing aggrieved persons with a day in court, the Birnbaum doctrine was unfair because it left injured parties without a
remedy.58 On the other hand, some judges saw the Birnbaum doctrine as being consistent with a policy against vexatious litigation
because, by constricting the class of plaintiffs, it necessarily reduced the volume of rule 10b-5 private lawsuits.59 The concern
over vexatious litigation became acute because of the speculative
nature of recovery permitted by the lower federal courts' treatment
of the element of damages.6
Damages: Increasing Exposure
In dealing with other aspects of rule 10b-5, the federal courts
were frequently preoccupied with the matter of damages. 1 In cases
of representations, 2 or omissions, 3 the defendant was potentially
57. City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 228 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 905 (1970). See Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 434 (10th Cir. 1973) (broad and
flexible constructions of Birnbaum rule); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806-07 (5th Cir.
1970) (same).
58. See, e.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule
10b-5, 54 VA. L. Rav. 268 (1968). See also note 57 supra.
59. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970); Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). But see Eason v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (volume of rule
10b-5 litigation will expand despite the Birnbaum doctrine). Cf. Petroleum Exploration, Inc.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938) ("the expense and annoyance of litigation
is 'part of the social burden of living under government' ").
60. See, e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822
(1970).
61. Judge Friendly, for example, in his concurring opinion in Texas Gulf Sulfur, expressed concern about using a negligence standard in connection with the imposition of
damages on a corporate defendant. He stated that "[t]he consequences of holding that negligence . . . may impose civil liability on the corporation are frightening . . . . '[A]ny
remedy imposed against the issuer itself is indirectly imposed on all holders of the common
stock, usually the most important segment of the total category of investors intended to be
protected."' SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) (Friendly, J., concurring) (quoting Cohen, Truth in Securities Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340, 1370 (1966)).
62. An example is the misleading press release in Texas Gulf Sulfur. See note 54
supra. See also Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971).
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liable to all persons who bought or sold the security in question
during a reasonable trading period after the wrongdoing occurred." Inasmuch as a faceless transaction made it impossible to
prove a causal relationship between a wrongful act and an injury,
there was no way to ensure that all persons suing had in fact sustained an injury, or to award damages proportionate to the defendant's wrongdoing.6 5 Where the defendant was a corporate entity,
the problem was compounded by the fact that the damages were
ultimately paid out of corporate coffers. In such cases, liability was
unfairly distributed, leaving innocent shareholders and creditors of
the corporation to suffer. 68
On balance, the elements of a rule 10b-5 private damages
action as developed by the lower federal courts prior to 1975
exhibited a favorable attitude toward rule 10b-5 private damage
lawsuits. The attitude was supported by congressional policiesmarket integrity, equal access to information, and equal bargaining
power-and arguably by certain judicially created policies such as
capital formation, the desire to encourage compliance with the securities laws, and the need to provide an injured party with a day
in court. On the other hand, the expansion of rule 10b-5 private
damages actions create'd problems for countervailing policies concerned with vexatious litigation, fairness, and sound judicial administration. The Supreme Court confronted these policy conflicts
63. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971).
64. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 238-41
(2d Cir. 1974) (citing cases).
65. Recently, the Sixth Circuit has attempted to deal with this problem by, in effect,
requiring a plaintiff to establish actual causation even in impersonal transactions. See
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318-19 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1976). It
may be impossible for any plaintiff to establish causation unless he or she purchased or sold
in a limited market. Nonetheless, the policies cited by the Sixth Circuit in support of its
position were as follows: "There is an obvious need to restrict the scope of civil liability of
insiders trading in the open market. If an insider trades in a widely-held stock which is
actively traded on a national market, the number of potential plaintiffs could be astronomical and the possible award of damages may be grossly disproportionate to the volume of the
insider trading." Id. at 323. Other policies might add support to this position. See note 61
supra. It is interesting to note that the American Law Institute would limit damages to the
defendant's profits, and the scope of liability to the number of shares bought or sold by the
defendant. See FEDERAL SEcuRTIms CODE § 1708(b)(2). Attacking the damages element directly may be the best way of handling the problems of speculative recovery and disproportionate damages.
66. See note 61 supra.
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in 1975.
Supreme Court Restrictions on Rule 10b-5
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores: Toward a New
Policy Perspective
The United States Supreme Court began to limit the proliferation of rule 10b-5 private damages actions in 1975 with its deci7
sion in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.1
Blue Chip was
the first of a succession of decisions imposing restrictions on rule
10b-5 private damages actions on public policy grounds.6 8
In Blue Chip, the Court was faced with the question of
whether offerees of a registered stock distribution, made pursuant
to an antitrust consent decree, could bring a rule 10b-5 action for
damages although they neither purchased nor sold any of the
stock. The plaintiff alleged that he and the class he purported to
represent were induced to refrain from purchasing shares of the
distribution by an overly pessimistic prospectus prepared and disseminated by the defendant, Blue Chip Stamps, in connection with
the distribution. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held
that the Birnbaum doctrine precluded the plaintiff from suing
under rule 1Ob-5. '9
Justice Rehnquist initially appeared to find support for his
holding in judicial precedent and the Congress itself.7 0 A number
of federal courts, however, had rejected or modified the Birnbaum
doctrine7 1 and, as Justice Rehnquist later admitted, there was no
way "to divine from the language of § 10b the express 'intent of
Congress' as to the contours of a private cause of action under
Rule 10b-5. '72 Even in the face of decisional or congressional support, it thus appears that the Court would have felt constrained to
reject the Birnbaum doctrine only if it had found acceptable coun67. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
68. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See also Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1109 (1980).

Although Chiarellainvolved an SEC criminal proceeding, the Supreme Court noted the implications of its decision on civil actions brought under rule 10b-5. Id. at 1118 n.22.
69. 421 U.S. at 755. It should be noted that the case was decided on the pleadings.
70. Id. at 733.
71. See notes 57-58 supra.
72. 421 U.S. at 737.
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tervailing policy support. 8 In the Court's determination, no such
support existed. Indeed, the Court specifically found that the policies supporting the Birnbaum doctrine outweighed the policies
favoring its demise.
Justice Rehnquist relied on a plethora of familiar judicial policies"4 to support the Court's holding. Basically, he stated that the
absence of a purchaser-seller rule would expand the class of plaintiffs by making available a "largely conjectural and speculative recovery. '7 5 This potential increase in the volume of litigation was
viewed as unfair to rule 10b-5 defendants and to the public as a
whole. Unfairness to the defendants, the Court reasoned, would result because the defendants might be subjected to the dangers of
vexatious litigation, 6 to abusive intrusions sanctioned by the liberal federal discovery rulesP77 and to periods of interruption in conducting business affairs totally unrelated to the lawsuit.78 Further,
because the case inevitably would have to go to the jury on the
question of whose version of the oral evidence to believe, the case
would be impossible to dispose of before trial other than by
settlement. 9
According to the Court, the public also would be harmed by
the absence of the Birnbaum doctrine. Judicial preoccupation with
complex securities class actions would overload the already
crowded dockets and create problems of judicial administration. 0
In addition, imposition of civil liability against a corporate defendant, particularly in a class action, could "lead to large judgments,
payable in the last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of
speculators and their lawyers."8 1
On the other hand, the Court could have rejected the Birn73. See note 9 & accompanying text supra.
74. See notes 59-66 & accompanying text supra.
75. 421 U.S. at 735.

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 739.
Id. at 741. See note 26 supra.
421 U.S. at 740.
Id. at 742.

80. "As Judge Higginbotham [has stated]... delay in litigation adversely affects not
only the litigants, but also others-witnesses and jurors-who become involved in the system." Levi, The Business of the Courts: A Summary and a Sense of Perspective,70 F.R.D.
212, 213 (1976). On the problem of judicial administration in the federal courts today, see D.
LouissLL & G. HAZARD, PLEADING AND PRACTICE 1132-52 (1979); Luskin, Building a Theory
of Case ProcessingTime, 62 JuDicATURE 115 (1978) (citing various studies).
81. 421 U.S. at 739 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir.
1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)). See note 61 supra.
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baum doctrine by relying on a number of other policy grounds.
The Court could have found that the Birnbaum doctrine frustrated the congressional policies recognized by the lower courts 2
and discouraged compliance with the securities laws insofar as it
countenanced market fraud beyond the class of purchasers or
sellers. Also, as to those persons, the Birnbaum doctrine arguably
frustrated the judicial policy of providing aggrieved parties with
their day in court.
Blue Chip laid bare the Supreme Court's attitude toward rule
1Ob-5 private damage actions: unless a plaintiff can support the
maintenance of an action on policy grounds favored by the
Court-the absence of vexatious litigation, overall fairness to the
defendant, and the promotion of efficient judicial administration-the merits of the action will not be adjudicated.8 In the
framework of this conceptual scheme, Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder8 presented a relatively simple case for the Court.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant accounting firm was negligent in failing to discover certain practices which might have revealed the fraudulent practices
of an officer of the issuer. The issue presented to the court was
whether the accountants could be sued for damages in a private
action under rule 10b-5 on a theory of negligent conduct. The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that scienter is
a separate and necessary element of a rule 10b-5 private action for
damages."5
Unlike Blue Chip, the Court found congressional support for
its holding." As in Blue Chip, however, the Court, by ruling in
favor of the negligence standard, could have effectuated a number
of important policies favoring plaintiffs in rule 10b-5 actions.8 7 In
view of the resulting expansion of the plaintiff class and the at82. See notes 45-47 & accompanying text supra.
83. These policies are succinctly stated in Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "These rules. . . [s]hal be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."
84. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
85. Id. at 214. As in Blue Chip, the Hochfelder case was decided on the pleadings.
86. The Court believed that the language of § 10(b) supported the scienter requirement. Id. at 201. See note 1 supra.
87. See note 82 & accompanying text supra.
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tendant policy considerations,"" such a ruling was highly unlikely.
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green
The Court addressed slightly different policy considerations
with its next rule 10b-5 decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green.8 9 In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court again reversed the lower
court on the reach and coverage of rule 10b-5.90 The issue
presented in Santa Fe was whether rule 10b-5 could be used to
redress an alleged breach of fiduciary duties arising under state
law. Santa Fe arose in the context of a Delaware shortform merger
freeze-out.
The Court held that a breach of fiduciary duty is actionable
under rule 10b-5 only if it involves manipulation or deception. As
it had done in Blue Chip and Hochfelder, the Court first looked to
the statute itself for an expression of congressional intent. Again,
the Court concluded that the plaintiffs could not find any support
on the face of section 10(b), or in its legislative history, for their
reading of rule lOb-5. 1
Although the Court declared that its interpretation of the
statute disposed of the issue, it nevertheless continued, noting that
even in the absence of such legislative support, "there are additional considerations that weigh heavily against" expansion of rule
10b-5 in the manner suggested by the plaintiffs.9 2 These considerations included comity 93 and the familiar judicial policies concerning vexatious litigation and judicial efficiency which were found
controlling in Blue Chip." It could also be argued that by permitting the federal securities laws to overlap with state corporate laws,
the strong policy in favor of sound judicial administration would
be frustrated.9 5
Unlike Blue Chip or Hochfelder, in Santa Fe there were no
88. See notes 74-81 & accompanying text supra.
89. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
90. Id. at 479-80. Again, the Court never considered the merits of the action; the case
was decided on the pleadings. The circuit court again had not fully appreciated the significance of either Blue Chip or Hochfelder. As the Court in Santa Fe stated: "The Court of
Appeals' approach to the interpretation of Rule 10b-5 is inconsistent with that taken by the
Court last Term in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. . "Id. at 471-72.
91. Id. at 473-74.
92. Id. at 477.

93. Id. at 478-79.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 479.
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competing congressional policies. Justice White, writing for the
majority, reasoned that such policies were not relevant to the issue
sub judice.96 It could also be argued that a "day in court" policy
was not relevant to the Court's inquiry in Santa Fe because the
minority shareholders there were advised of their appraisal rights
9 7
under Delaware law and could have brought suit in state court.
Chiarella v. United States
With its decision in Chiarella v. United States,9 8 the Court
returned to policy conflicts similar to those presented in Blue Chip
and Hochfelder. In Chiarella, the petitioner, a markup man for a
New York financial printer, was able to determine the identities of
target companies from corporate bidders' draft documents handled
by the printing house. None of the documents contained the identities of the bidder or target companies until the night of the final
printing. Without disclosing his knowledge of impending takeover
bids to shareholders of the target companies, the petitioner purchased stock on the open market, and sold the acquired shares
immediately after the takeover attempts became public. The petitioner was indicted and subsequently convicted on seventeen
counts of violating section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5.
The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction, but was reversed by
the Supreme Court.9 9
The Court, in a six to three decision with two concurring opinions, held that the petitioner did not have a duty to disclose his
knowledge to the shareholders of the target companies before entering into the transactions. The decision emphasized that the petitioner had no prior dealings with the shareholders of the target
companies, was not a corporate insider, and had not received any
confidential information directly from the target companies. 10 0 The
Court held that liability under rule 10b-5 in cases of omission must
be premised on a relationship of "trust and confidence between
parties to a transaction,"10 1 not on the mere possession of market
information. The Court thus rejected the theory advanced most
96. Id. at 477.
97. Id. at 466.
98. 100 S. Ct. 1109 (1980).
99. Id. at 1118. As in Blue Chip, Hochfelder,and Santa Fe, Chiarellawas decided on
the pleadings.
100. Id. at 1116-17.

101. Id.
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prominently in Texas Gulf Sulfur,10 2 which held that a person in
possession of material, nonpublic information "owed a duty to
everyone; to all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole." 103
The Court's rejection of the parity-of-information rule advanced in Texas Gulf Sulfur was premised on the absence of explicit evidence of congressional intent in section 10(b) or its legislative history."" On the other hand, the Court could have found
support for the Texas Gulf Sulfur rule by analogy to the position
it had taken in Mills, insofar as the parity-of-interest rule appears
to effectuate relevant congressional policies. 10 5 The consequence of
a vindication of these policies under the facts of the case, however,
would have been to expand the class of potential plaintiffs which,
in turn, would create the policy conflict analyzed and resolved in
Blue Chip.108

The New Mandate: Policies for the Future
Interpretation of Rule lOb-5
Without question, the Supreme Court's decisions during the
latter part of the 1970's have substantially restricted the scope and
availability of rule 10b-5 in private actions. In cases of omission,
strangers to a securities transaction no longer are constrained by
standards of fair dealing. The scope of the duty to deal fairly is
limited to persons joined by a relationship of trust or confidence
with the person on the other side of the transaction.0 7 Even then,
damages cannot be recovered unless the plaintiff actually traded in
the securities 0 8 and is able to establish the defrauder's scienter. 10 9
Further, cases of mismanagement not involving manipulation or
fraud are not cognizable under rule 10b-5. 110
The legal grounds on which the Court is basing its conservative construction of rule 10b-5 are consistent. The Court first looks
to the face of section 10(b) and its legislative history for express
102.
103.

See notes 43-44 & accompanying text supra.
100 S. Ct. at 1117.

104. Id.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See
See
See
See
See
See

notes 45-49 & accompanying text supra.
notes 74-81 & accompanying text supra.
notes 100-03 & accompanying text supra.
note 69 & accompanying text supra.
note 86 & accompanying text supra.
note 91 & accompanying text supra.
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congressional support for the proposed expansion.1 1 ' Absent such
support, a case will be dismissed on the pleadings.
The Court's demand for express congressional evidence seems
misplaced. It is the very absence of an express statutory cause of
action which makes necessary the implication of a rule 10b-5 private cause of action. As the Court itself noted, it is impossible "to
divine from the language of § 10(b) the express 'intent of Congress'
as to the contours of a private cause of action under Rule 10b-

5.'1112 Hence, requiring a private litigant to meet the burden of
demonstrating express congressional consent seems unfair. Perhaps
in recognition of this, the Court is consistently turning to policy
considerations to support its decisions even when the pertinent legal arguments are, in the Court's view, dispositive.115
The policy underpinnings of the Court's new position on rule
10b-5 seem clear. Certain congressional policies which at one time
seemed preeminent in the construction of rule lOb-5 1 1 ' have given
way to the exigencies of the moment, replaced by the competing
concerns regarding vexatious, inefficient, and unmanageable litigation.1 1 5 Considering the growth of public debate over the recent ascendancy of public advocacy as the dominant form of federal litigation, 11 6 it is difficult to confess surprise at the Court's present
attitude toward rule 10b-5.

Litigation Alternatives to Rule 10b-5
In view of the Supreme Court's curtailment of rule 10b-5 private damage suits, a plaintiff may have to look elsewhere for recovery. The most likely litigation alternatives are state law actions
and express federal actions. 17
111.
112.
113.

See notes 104-05 & accompanying text supra.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 US. 462, 477 (1977).

114.

See notes 45-47 & accompanying text supra.

115. See notes 74-81 & accompanying text supra.
116. See, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 1281 (1976); Levi, The Business of Courts:A Summary and a Sense of Perspective,70
F.R.D. 212 (1976).
117. For a detailed discussion of state and express federal actions, see Cherner, supra
note 1; Douglas & Bates, The FederalSecurities Act of 1933, 43

YALE

L.J. 171 (1933); Shul-

man, supra note 10. See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 207-11 (1976). See
generally note 2 supra.
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Actions Under State Law
A variety of state law actions are available to support a claim
for private damages premised on an allegedly unscrupulous securities transaction. These state actions are essentially of two types:
actions at common law and actions expressly provided for by state
securities statutes, commonly referred to as Blue Sky Laws. In addition to common law actions for fraud,11 breach of contract, and
conversion or other tort,119 a proper plaintiff may have a claim for
damages arising from a breach of fiduciary duty owed by the defendant. Premised on common law notions as well as on express
statutes, in some cases courts have found such a duty to be owed
by majority stockholders to minority shareholders. 12 0 Expanded
concepts of "fiduciary" have correspondingly increased the duty of
an "insider" to disclose material information when engaged in securities transactions. 21
In most states, certain express statutory actions are available
to plaintiffs.1 22 Such statutes frequently provide a plaintiff who
purchased or sold securities with a private right of action against a
seller or purchaser who induced the transaction by means of false
or misleading statements or the use of any device or artifice to defraud.12 Not surprisingly, many of these state action statutes are
patterned after, if not direct duplications of, rule 10b-5.12 ' These
similarities in language, coupled with the proclivity on the part of
many state courts to rely upon interpretations *ofrule 10b-5 by the
118. See notes 10-34 & accompanying text supra.
119. See Cherner, supra note 1, at 666-67 (citing cases).
120. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); People v. Concord
Fabrics, Inc., 86 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550, af'd, 50 A.D.2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84
(1975).
121. An insider's fiduciary duty to disclose material information has been expanded
both by case law, see, e.g., Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949);
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, N.Y.S.2d (1969), and by statute. See
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25402 (West 1977) (definition of "insider" for this purpose to include "an
issuer or any person who is an officer, director or controlling person of an issuer or any other
person whose relationship to the issuer gives him access, directly or indirectly, to material
information about the issuer not generally available to the public").
122. See L. Loss & E. CowErr, BLUE SKY LAWS (1958); Cherner, supra note 2, at 667;
[1980] 1 SEC. REG. GUIDE (P-H)
1201-1351; [1980] 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) §§'49014953 (Uniform Securities Act).
123. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25400 (West 1977).
124. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.010 (1974). The UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT, adopted in
some form by a majority of states, includes an exact copy of the provisions of rule 10b-5. Id.
§ 101. The actual effect of § 101, however, is apparently limited in those states also adopting
§ 410(h).

November 1980]

RULE 10b-5

federal courts in applying their own antifraud statutes,1 25 raise the
possibility that state courts may restrict the availability of state
statutory actions in line with the United States Supreme Court's
recent rule 10b-5 decisions.
In light of the recently imposed obstacles to bringing a private 10b-5 action for damages, a litigant may find that the state
forum provides some distinct advantages over the federal forum.
Substantively, while the standard required to establish liability
will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and depend upon the
cause of action stated, a plaintiff in a state court will find that "the
standard is certainly no more difficult than the standard now imposed under rule 10b-5.' 2 Indeed, under some theories a plaintiff
will find that standard to be substantially easier to meet. For
example, in Thompson v. Walker,127 involving material misstatements by corporate officers and directors, the Michigan Supreme
Court held that a showing of scienter or even of bad faith was unnecessary to support a finding of liability for fraud. Although the
court spoke in terms of "legal fraud," it is clear that the holding
was premised on the underlying fiduciary duty owed by the defendants.1 28 Furthermore, several state courts have expressly held that
proof of scienter is not required to establish liability under their
Blue Sky statutes.129
Additionally, many state statutes provide a successful plaintiff
with a more substantial recovery than is available in federal courts.
In some states, punitive damages may be awarded in actions based
on a claim of fraud, either as defined at common law or by statute.13 0 In a majority of states, a plaintiff succeeding in an action
expressly created by the state's Blue Sky Law is entitled to recover
reasonable attorneys' fees from the defendant. 3 1 The availability
of these remedies in the state forum is in contrast to the federal
system of express securities actions. Although an award of reasona125. For a discussion, see R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURrrms REGULATION 1317-18
(4th ed. 1977). See also Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wash. App. 845, 472 P.2d 589 (1970).
126. Cherner, supra note 1, at 666.
127. 253 Mich. 126, 234 N.W. 144 (1931).
128. See id. at 136, 234 N.W. at 148.
129. See, e.g., People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550,
afld, 50 A.D.2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975); Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wash. App. 845, 472 P.2d
589 (1970).
130. See Cherner, supra note 1, at 667.
131. Id.
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ble attorneys' fees is provided for under those actions, 1 2 in some
cases it is clear that punitive damages are not available in any federal securities actions. 133
On the other hand, the state courts impose significant procedural hurdles not encountered in federal litigation. At the outset, a
plaintiff in a state securities action must overcome the state court's
restricted territorial jurisdiction. 3 4 The problem is compounded in
class actions involving nonresident members.13 5 Procedural restrictions in some states present additional complications in class action suits not found in federal actions. 13 6 However, the federal prohibition on preliminary apportionment of notice costs has been
rejected in at least one state, New York, making maintenance of a
large class action suit much more practicable.13 7 State statutes requiring security-for-expenses bonds in derivative actions present
an additional procedural hurdle to plaintiffs. 188
In contrast, the federal securities laws provide for nationwide
132. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 781(e), 78r(a) (1976). But see Cherner, supra note 1,
at 667 (citing Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J.
CORP. L. 267 (1978)).
133. See De Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); Green v.
Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969) (stating that
§ 28(a) of the 1934 Act limits recovery to "actual damages"); Cherner, supra note 1. However, punitive damages can be recovered on pendent state claims. See De Haas v. Empire
Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
134. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
135. See Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 362 A.2d 1177 (1976);
Klemow v. Time, Inc., 466 Pa. 189, 325 A.2d 12 (1976). But see Hartford Life Ins. Co. v.
Barber, 245 U.S. 146 (1917); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915) (states to give
full faith and credit to class action judgments of sister states).
136. For example, class certification in some code states may not be as easy as in the
federal courts, and res judicata problems may arise in the state courts. See Cherner, supra
note 1, at 668-69.
137. Compare Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), with N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
LAW §§ 901-909 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1978). See generally JAMES & HAZARD, supra note
26, § 10.18.
138. Some state courts require plaintiffs with small stockholdings to post security for
costs or expenses in derivative suits. See Cherner, supra note 1, at 668. See, e.g., CAL. CORP.
CODE § 800 (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 627 (McKinney 1976); MODEL Bus. CORP.
AcT § 49. The purpose of these statutes is to prevent very small shareholders from bringing
frivolous derivative suits for harassment purposes. See WOOD, SURmVa AD REPORT REGARDIMG STocKHoLD s' DERmIVATm Surrs (1944). One fairly recent study concluded that the
security-for-expenses statutes are a minor factor in the prosecution of shareholder suits.
-Security for Expenses in Shareholders'Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 50 (1968).
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jurisdiction and venue.139 Procedural impediments to class 40 and
derivative' actions, present in most states, are substantially ameliorated by more liberal federal procedure. Of additional benefit to
a federal securities law plaintiff are the broad federal rules of discovery.142 Primarily because of these procedural benefits, the advantages of state court litigation have not slowed the ascendancy
of federal rule lOb-5 claims as the principal means of relief sought
by plaintiffs alleging securities fraud. If a plaintiff had a choice, he
or she ultimately would opt for the federal courts. With the recent
limitations placed on rule lOb-5 private actions, however, a plaintiff's only hope of getting into federal court may be pursuant to an
applicable express statutory provision.
Express Federal Actions
There are a number of federal statutory provisions which
expressly provide a remedy to persons injured in securities transactions.1 43 For the purpose of this Article only three of these provisions need be discussed: sections 1144 and 12(2)145
of the Securi14
ties Act of 1933, and section 18 of the 1934 Act. 1
Section 11 of the 1933 Act
Section 11 provides a cause of action in cases of untrue statements or omissions of material 147 facts in a registration statement
that has become effective.1 48 In order to prevail in an action under
section 11, in addition to proving damages,' 41 a plaintiff need only
establish the defendant's negligence.1 50 Scienter, privity, reliance,
139. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa (1976). Section 77v also gives the federal courts concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts, whereas the latter provision grants the federal
courts exclusive subject matter jurisdiction.
140. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See generally JAmzs & HAZARD, supra note 26, § 10.18.
141. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. See generally JAmEs & HAZARD, supra note 26, § 10.18.
142. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 26-38. See also note 26 supra.
143. For a detailed discussion, see sources cited in note 117 supra.Most of the express

remedies are so limited as to be of little use as a worthwhile alternative to bringing an
action under rule 10b-5.
144. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976).
145. Id. § 771(2).
146. Id. § 78r.
147. See note 41 supra.
148.

See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976). See also id. § 77f(a).

149. See id. § 77k(e). The amount of recovery may not exceed the offering price of the
securities in question. See id. § 77k(g).
150. See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
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and causation need not be established.151
The class of potential defendants in a section 11 action includes every person who signed the registration statement and directors, underwriters, and experts who certified or prepared any
part of the registration statement.152 With the exception of the issuer, each defendant is provided with a number of statutory defenses. Foremost among the available defenses are proof that the
defendant had reasonable grounds to believe the statements were
true when made, or that the defendant, in signing the registration
statement, was relying on the authority of an expert other than the
defendant. 15
Section 11 actions are beset by a number of complications and
potential pitfalls. Section 11 does not provide defrauded sellers of
securities with a cause of action." In addition, a section 11 action
has a short statute of limitations that requires the action to be
filed within one year after the untrue statement or omission is
made or reasonably should have been discovered, but in no event
155
more than three years from the initial offering date.
Section 11 actions' do have some distinct advantages. State
security-for-expenses statutes usually do not apply to claims arising under the 1933 or 1934 Act.156 In addition, the federal court
can award attorneys' fees either upon a party's motion or sua
sponte in frivolous cases.157 Finally, a plaintiff bringing a claim
under section 11 has the option of filing and having the case heard
in either state or federal court. 8
Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act
Section 12(2) prohibits the offer or sale of a security by means
151. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976). Reliance must be established after the publication
of earnings covering the period of 12 months subsequent to the effective date of the registration statement. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. § 77k(b).
154. See note 44 supra.
155. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976).
156. See note 138 supra. See also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1964);
McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961). The
security-for-expenses statute is applicable to state court claims tried in federal court on
grounds of diversity or pendent jurisdiction. See Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 66-67

(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
157. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976).
158. See note 139 supra.
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of a prospectus or oral communication containing a material 5 untrue statement or an omission of a material fact.160 To invoke section 12(2) for the recovery of damages, a plaintiff must establish
damages,"'1 privity,1 2 and perhaps causation.1 6 3 A section 12(2)

plaintiff need not prove scienter or reliance.""
A plaintiff suing under section 12(2) is faced with the same
procedural benefits and disadvantages present in section 11 actions. Attorneys' fees may be awarded, 1e5 the action may be tried
in state court,1 66 and the limitations imposed by state security-forexpenses statutes are inapplicable.167 Conversely, the lack of a remedy for defrauded sellers 68 and a short statute of limitations 6 e
present a plaintiff in pursuit of a remedy under section 12(2) with

counterbalancing disadvantages.
Section 18 of the 1934 Act
Section 18 creates civil liability for materia 17 0 misleading
statements contained in documents or reports filed with the SEC
pursuant to the 1934 Act. 7 1 A plaintiff in a section 18 cause of
action must establish damages, 172 reliance,1 73 and causation,1 74 but
neither scienter17 5 nor privity17 e is required.
159. See note 41 supra.
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
161. See id.
162. Liability runs between the person who purchased the securities and the person
who offered or sold them to the buyer. Id. See Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609 F.2d 1028 (2d
Cir. 1979); Debruin v. Andromeda Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Nev. 1979).
163. See Jackson v. Oppenheim, 533 F.2d 826, 830 n.8 (2d Cir. 1976).
164. See Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1979); Phillips v. Alabama
Credit Corp., 403 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1968).
165. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976).
166. See note 139 supra.
167. See note 156 supra.
168. See note 44 supra.
169. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976).
170. See note 41 supra.
171. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976). For a discussion of the reporting requirements under
the 1934 Act, see Brooks, Small Business FinancingAlternatives under the Securities Act
of 1933, 13 U. CAL. D.L. Rsv. 543, 546 n.13 (1980).
172. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
173. See id. See also Ross v. Warner, 480 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
175. See id. Section 18 exculpates a defendant who "acted in good faith and had no
knowledge that such statement was false or misleading." Id.
176. Any person who files a material misleading statement is liable when the plaintiff
relies thereon. See id.
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The benefits and drawbacks of section 18 are similar to those
discussed above in reference to sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933
Act, with two exceptions. First, the federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over actions brought under the provisions of the 1934
Act, 177 although federal courts can entertain state claims pendent
to a claim brought under the 1934 Act. 171 Second, as a practical
matter, section 18 applies only to medium-sized or large corporations because small corporations are not likely
to be subjected to
17 9
the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act.

Limited Viability of Alternatives
As alternatives to rule 10b-5, the state and express federal
actions have many shortcomings. The limitations on bringing actions in state court include the lack of nationwide venue and service of process and the absence of relatively liberal discovery and
class action rules. In addition, the plaintiffs in some state courts
must comply
with security-for-expenses statutes in derivative
1 0a
actions.
The shortcomings of the express federal actions are equally
significant. Even though the express actions do not require scienter, they are more restrictive than rule 10b-5 because they are governed by relatively short statutes of limitations and fail to provide
a defrauded seller of securities with a cause of action. Rule 10b-5,
as is the case with all implied actions, is governed by the applicable state statute of limitations,1 81 which is usually longer than the
federal statute of limitations in express actions.8 2 Finally, a defrauded seller as well as a defrauded buyer may sue for relief under
rule 10b-5.1a8
177.

See note 139 supra.

178. See Lowenfels, PendentJurisdictionand the Federal Securities Acts, 67 COLUM.
L. REv. 474 (1967).

179. See Brooks, Small Business FinancingAlternatives under the Securities Act of
1933, 13 U. CAL. D.L. REV. 543, 546 n.13 (1980).

180. Compliance with security-for-expenses statutes may not be a serious problem.
See note 138 supra.
181. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
182. There is no absolute rule as to which state statute of limitations governs the action. See, e.g., In re Alodex Corp., 533 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1976) (court applied Iowa Blue Sky
two-year statute of limitations in lieu of Iowa common law fraud five-year statute of
limitations).
183. See note 44 supra.
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Conclusion
That the Supreme Court is committed to curtailing the continued expansion of rule 10b-5 private damages actions is clear beyond peradvanture. 18 There is growing evidence that the lower
federal courts have also joined this effort.185 Consequently, it behooves the plaintiffs' securities bar to consider alternative litigation strategies.
Undoubtedly, the plaintiffs' bar will impugn the fairness of the
Supreme Court's present attitude toward rule 10b-5 private damages actions. However, given the systematic vitiation of such traditional limiting doctrines as privity, scienter, and causation, coupled
with the resultant opportunity for draconian liability, there is an
obvious need to keep rule 10b-5 within reasonable bounds. As is
always the case when complex choices must be made among countervailing and often incompatible policies, the question of whether
the Supreme Court's actions have been excessive can be answered
categorically only if the issue is manifestly oversimplified.

184. See note 2 supra.
185. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Continental Ill Nat'l Bank & Trust, 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir.
1979). See also note 65 supra.

